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Abstract
A signicant proportion of international trade is in intermediate goods. This
paper considers theoretically and empirically how exporters dependence on im-
ported inputs a¤ects their choice of invoicing currency. The model predicts that
exporters that depend more on foreign currency-denominated inputs are less likely
to price in their home currency. I test this and other theoretical results using a
novel dataset that covers UK trade transactions with non-EU countries. I nd con-
siderable support for the models predictions. A 10 percentage point higher share
of foreign currency-denominated inputs is associated with a 20 percentage point
higher probability of pricing in the same foreign currency relative to the producers
currency.
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1 Introduction
The currency denomination of international trade has real e¤ects on the macroeconomy.
When prices are sticky, the currency in which goods are priced determines how trade
balances and domestic prices respond to changes in exchange rates. Whether prices
are set in the exporters currency (producer currency pricing, PCP) or the importers
currency (local currency pricing, LCP) has been a long-debated issue for modelling in
the open economy macroeconomics literature. Early work has also documented the
far-ranging policy implications of the choice of invoicing currency for the international
transmission of macroeconomic shocks, the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy, and the
choice of exchange rate regimes.1
However, it is only recently that rmsinvoicing currency choice has been considered
endogenous in theory and linked to endogenous exchange rate pass-through (e.g., Dev-
ereux et al., 2004; Engel, 2006; Gopinath et al., 2010). A fundamental question, then, is
what determines the invoicing currency choice. This paper addresses the question and,
in particular, theoretically and empirically examines whether exportersdependence on
imported inputs determines their invoicing currency choice.
To guide the empirical strategy, I develop a theoretical framework that features rm
heterogeneity in the degree of dependence on imported inputs together with endogenous
invoicing currency choice. In a two-country setting with exchange rate uncertainty, the
prot-maximizing exporter is assumed to optimally preset prices in a chosen invoicing
currency, taking foreign input prices (denominated in the foreign currency) as given.
The theoretical results formulate two testable hypotheses that relate imported inputs to
rmschoice of invoicing currency. First, exporters that depend more on imported inputs
are less likely to use their home currency. This result is consistent with the intuition
that exporters using foreign currency-denominated inputs have a hedging incentive to
set prices in the same foreign currency to minimize exchange rate risks. However, note
that rms are assumed to be risk-neutral in the model.2 The second prediction is that
rms that do not depend on imported inputs are more likely to use their home currency,
everything else being equal.
Further, I test the theorys predictions using a novel and rich dataset of the UKs
non-EU trade statistics, recorded by Her Majestys Revenue and Customs (HMRC). The
dataset contains 2.54 million export transactions and 7.31 million import transactions
1Betts and Devereux (1996) are the rst to introduce LCP, as opposed to the assumption of PCP
in the Redux model (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1995) in the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM)
literature. Devereux and Engel (2003) allow prices to be exogenously set in both. See, among others,
Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Devereux and Engel (2002) for the implications for monetary and
exchange rate policies.
2Technically, this result comes from the curvatures of the revenue and cost functions. Also, see
previous studies such as Baron (1976), Giovannini (1988), Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991), and Friberg
(1998).
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in 2011. A distinctive feature of the data is that for each transaction, both invoicing
currency and rm identity are recorded, along with the country of dispatch or destina-
tion, product and industry codes, statistical values, and other custom variables. Thus, I
can match import and export data to identify each exporters dependence on imported
inputs together with the currency denomination of these inputs.3
I start the empirical analysis by documenting a large variation in invoicing currency
choice across destinations and industries. For example, the share of exports priced in
British pounds is approximately 55 percent for the manufacturing industry, whereas
the share is close to 70 percent for the food industry. Additionally, exports to the US
have the highest share of LCP (47 percent in dollars) among all destinations. Next,
I review the stylized facts about the di¤erent patterns of invoicing currency choice
between importing exporters and non-importing exporters. In particular, three quarters
of non-importing exporters (26,618 rms in total) use only the pound as an invoicing
currency, whereas the fraction declines to only half for importing exporters (32,289
rms in total). These ndings point to rm characteristics as the main explanation for
such discrepancies in invoicing currency choice because these two groups do not di¤er
systematically in industry presence, export destination, and the type of goods.
As suggested by the theory, the main empirical specication relates invoicing cur-
rency choice to rmsimport behavior and the currency denomination of their inputs.
The results provide strong support for the theory that importing exporters are less likely
to use PCP compared with non-importing exporters after controlling for rm size, des-
tination, and industry e¤ects. Specically, a 10 percentage point higher share of foreign
currency-denominated inputs is associated with a 20 percentage point higher probabil-
ity of LCP relative to PCP. Furthermore, among importing exporters, a rm with a
share of pound-denominated inputs at the 75th percentile is approximately 40 percent
less likely to use LCP relative to PCP compared with a rm whose imported inputs are
all priced in foreign currencies. The ndings also relate currency choice to other rm
characteristics. For instance, larger exporters are less inclined to use PCP, a nding
that supports the argument that larger rms are more likely to hedge using nancial
instruments.4
In practice, goods may be priced in a third currency other than the exporters and the
importers currency. This option namely, vehicle currency pricing (VCP) is indeed
present in the UK trade data and it accounts for 56 percent of imports and 28 percent
3The categorization of goods is based on the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) which decomposes
goods into three end-use categories: consumption (nal), intermediate, and capital goods. I treat both
intermediate and capital goods as industrial inputs. Trade in intermediate goods is also related to the
following terms: vertical specialization, outsourcing, and fragmentation. See, e.g., Hummels et al. (2001)
for denitions.
4This argument states that hedging incurs a xed cost that large rms are more able to a¤ord. See,
for instance, Martin and Méjean (2012) for the survey results of 3,013 exporting rms located in ve
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries.
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of exports (primarily in dollars). In a separate section of extensions, I rst extend the
two-country model to allow for the option of VCP and the use of VCP inputs. As in
the two-country framework, the model identies a similar channel through which input
currency denomination a¤ects invoicing currency choice. It predicts that VCP is more
likely for exporters with a higher share of VCP inputs, a result strongly supported by
the UK trade data.5
To complement the main analysis, I review the 2011 currency denomination of UK
imports and examine whether the use of imported inputs determines currency denomi-
nation at the country level. I use a systematic measure of value added to gross exports
(VAX ratios) computed by Johnson and Noguera (2012) as a proxy for a countrys
dependence on imported inputs. If a country heavily relies on imported inputs, the value
added to gross exports should be lower by denition. Hence, VAX ratios are inversely
related to the dependence on imported inputs. I nd that countries that depend more
on foreign inputs systematically use less of their home currencies for exports.6
This paper is complementary to existing theoretical studies on the determinants of
invoicing currency. My theoretical framework is closely related to Engel (2006), who
provides the insight that a higher share of costs incurred in the foreign currency is asso-
ciated with more LCP and a lower exchange rate pass-through via an equivalence result.
This result also o¤ers an alternative intuition other than rmshedging incentives for
explaining the deviation from PCP. When a rm would prefer a low pass-through were
it to adjust prices freely, it is more likely to use LCP. The main departure I make from
this literature is to introduce a specic two-tier production structure that features rm
heterogeneity in the degree of dependence on imported inputs.7 In the robustness check
section, I control for a number of other factors discussed in the vast literature on invoic-
ing currency choice: (i) macroeconomic considerations, such as exchange rate volatility
(Devereux et al., 2004) and the transaction costs of exchange (Devereux and Shi, 2013);
(ii) strategic characteristics, such as bargaining between exporters and importers (Gold-
berg and Tille, 2008); and (iii) goods characteristics (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2003,
2005).
Furthermore, this paper contributes to the empirical literature on the currency de-
nomination of international trade, which is relatively scarce. The lack of empirical evi-
5However, other theoretical predictions that relate VCP to exchange rate movements are not sup-
ported by the data. These ndings may suggest that VCP is due to rmsother considerations such as
the transaction costs of exchange (Devereux and Shi, 2013) and an industry coalescing e¤ect (Goldberg
and Tille, 2008), rather than rmsprot-maximizing behavior. It may also be the case that the theory
introduced is lacking in some way and hence cannot reconcile all pricing strategies.
6 I also use a further disaggregated VAX ratio at the country-industry level and the results still hold.
These ratios are computed by Johnson and Noguera on the basis of the GTAP database and are not
published in their paper.
7Engel (2006) provides an example of the decision rule that encompasses many other models with
the assumption that the cost function is homogeneous of degree one. My model deviates from this
assumption and, hence, does not belong to one of these special cases.
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dence is in large part due to a lack of disaggregated datasets. For a long time, little was
known beyond several stylized facts based primarily on aggregated data.8 For instance,
trade in primary products is mostly denominated in US dollars, whereas trade between
developing and industrialized countries is predominantly invoiced in the industrialized
countrys currency. Also, the fact that inationary currencies are less likely to be used
is documented.9 Some studies turn to a survey approach, such as Friberg and Wilander
(2008) for Swedish exporters and Ito et al. (2010) for Japanese exporters. More recent
literature has also seen new evidence from disaggregated data, for instance, Goldberg
and Tille (2009) with Canadian import transactions. This paper adds new rm-level
evidence to the empirical literature, with a particular focus on imported inputs as a key
determinant for invoicing currency choice.
This paper also relates to the growing body of literature on endogenous exchange
rate pass-through that examines the role of either imported inputs or invoicing currency
choice, or the interaction of both. For example, Amiti et al. (2014) document the
direct link between imported inputs and pass-through. In contrast to my focus on
currency choice, they highlight the interaction between variable markups and market
shares as the underlying channel contributing to the variation in pass-through across
rms. Concerning invoicing currency, Gopinath et al. (2010) show a large di¤erence in
the pass-through of the average good priced in dollars versus non-dollars.10 They further
consider the cost sensitivity of rms to exchange rate shocks (which directly relates to
imported inputs) for determining incomplete pass-through in a calibration exercise, as
an empirical implementation of the theoretical result of Engel (2006). Consistent with
these implications, my ndings provide direct rm-level evidence showing that exporters
that depend more on imported inputs are more likely to use LCP.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a simple model to
demonstrate how rmschoice of invoicing currency is a¤ected by the presence of im-
ported inputs. Section 3 describes the dataset and documents new stylized patterns of
invoicing currency choice in the data. Section 4 presents the main empirical ndings.
Section 5 rst extends the analysis to VCP and then provides country-level evidence of
the e¤ect of imported inputs on invoicing currency choice. Section 6 concludes.
8One example is Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) who consider country size and exchange rate uncer-
tainty as key determinants for the invoicing currency choice of Canadian imports. Additionally, Wilander
(2005) analyzes currency use for Swedish exports using country aggregates such as GDP, distance, and
ination rates as explanatory variables.
9See, for example, Grassman (1973), McKinnon (1979) and Tavlas (1997) for the early studies.
10See, also, Floden and Wilander (2006) for the theoretical link between rmsprice adjustments and
invoicing currency choice, and Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) for the empirical evidence from the US.
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2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I develop a framework that relates invoicing currency choice to rms
dependence on imported inputs, both of which are endogenously determined. The two
main ingredients of the framework are the Halpern et al. (in press) model of the rms
choice to import foreign inputs and the Engel (2006) model of endogenous invoicing cur-
rency choice under exchange rate uncertainty.11 Detailed model derivations are shown
in Appendix A.
To focus the analysis on the link between imported inputs and invoicing currency
choice, I make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, I assume that exporters
take the prices and the currency denomination of foreign inputs as given. In fact, some
exporters could negotiate with their trading partners for a desirable currency a practice
documented by Friberg and Wilander (2008) and Goldberg and Tille (2009). If exporters
are allowed to decide on the currency in which their imported inputs are denominated,
how would they choose, taking the currency denomination of exports as given? An
intuitive guess is that the currency used for exports is more likely to be selected for
imports. However, given any price quotes for the foreign inputs (for example, a payment
of USD 100 or GBP 65), cost minimization ensures that the rm always selects the
cheaper deal based on its own (known) expected value of the exchange rate, regardless
of its quantity demanded and import intensity. Thus, exchange rate uncertainty plays
no role in the input currency choice for price takers. From a modelling perspective, this
could be easily incorporated into the model.12
Second, I assume that all imported inputs are denominated in the foreign currency.
The model could be extended to allow for a fraction of the imported inputs to be
denominated in the home currency. This extension reduces the degree of input price
uncertainty but does not qualitatively change the models predictions. In the empirical
analysis, I take into account each rms share of imported inputs denominated in the
home currency.
Lastly, the two-country framework excludes the possibility of VCP. The framework
can also be extended to allow for imported inputs from a third country and the option
of VCP. In this case, the rms decision rule also depends on the covariance between
the two exchange rates vis-à-vis the vehicle currency. This model extension and the
empirical evidence of VCP are discussed in Section 5.1.
11Halpern et al. (in press) focus on the relationship between rms choice of import varieties and
productivity.
12Note that under monopolistic competition exporters choose their own invoicing currency for exports.
Following a similar logic, their trading partners (foreign importers) could also negotiate for a desirable
currency. In the robustness section of the empirical analysis, I control for the bargaining power of
importers and exporters.
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2.1 Demand
Consider a risk-neutral rm i that sells a di¤erentiated good to a foreign country and
faces a CES demand function:
D (pi) =
 
pi
P hf
! 
P hf
P 
 
D; (1)
where D is the quantity demanded, pi is the rms price, P hf is the price index for all
domestic goods sold in the foreign country, and P  is the foreign consumer price index
(all denominated in the foreign currency). D is the foreign demand shifter that is
independent of prices. The parameter  is the elasticity of substitution across varieties
with  > 1. The parameter  is the foreign elasticity of demand for domestic goods.
2.2 Production and Import Intensity
The rm uses labor Li and intermediate goods Xi to produce, following a Cobb-Douglas
production function with constant returns to scale given by
Yi = AiX

i L
1 
i ; (2)
where Ai is the rms productivity and  2 [0; 1] measures the expenditure share on
intermediate inputs. The cost of labor is the wage rate W .
Intermediate goods comprise two varieties domestic and foreign that are imper-
fect substitutes:
Xi =

Z

1+
i + (aiMi)

1+
 1+

; (3)
where Zi and Mi are the quantities of domestic and imported inputs, respectively. The
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign varieties is (1 + ) > 1.13 I
assume that the price of the domestic input Zi is Q, denominated in the home currency.
The price of the foreign input Mi is SQ, S being the exchange rate (dened as the
domestic price of foreign currency), and Q being the price denominated in the foreign
currency.
The parameter ai captures the productivity of rm i in using foreign inputs, which
in this model varies across rms and directly determines the degree of dependence on
imported inputs. A high ai represents a high productivity advantage for rm i in using
foreign inputs, and vice versa.14
13As domestic and foreign inputs are imperfect substitutes, production is possible without the use of
imported inputs. Note that the model also accommodates the cases of perfect substitutes (when  !1)
and perfect complements (when  ! 0). In the Appendix, I discuss rmsuse of imported inputs and
their decision rules in these cases.
14When ai > 1, using foreign inputs brings productivity advantages. In contrast, ai < 1 implies
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The rm pays a sunk cost fi in terms of labor for importing foreign inputs.15 Given
any output level, the rm rst chooses the amount of inputs to minimize its total cost
subject to the production technology. The total cost of the rm is given byWLi+QZi+
SQMi +Wfi; which can be written as the sum of a variable cost plus a xed cost:
TCi = iY +Wfi:
The marginal cost i can be derived as
i =
C
Aib

i
; (4)
where C = (Q=) [W= (1  )]1  is a cost index and bi 

1 +

ai
SQ=Q
1=
is the
productivity-enhancing e¤ect from using imported inputs. The productivity-enhancing
e¤ect is increasing in the productivity parameter ai.
Using this cost structure, I dene  i as the share of costs spent on imported inputs
in the total costs of intermediate goods:
 i 
SQMi
SQMi +QZi
:
The parameter  i directly captures the rms degree of dependence on foreign inputs.
The home share of inputs (1   i) can be shown as
1   i =
"
1 +

ai
SQ=Q
# 1
= b i : (5)
The home share of inputs depends on the productivity parameter ai: A rm with a
higher productivity gain from using imported inputs (higher ai and, accordingly, higher
bi) has a stronger dependence on imported inputs and a lower home share of inputs.
2.3 PCP versus LCP
After deciding on the amount of inputs, the rm is then assumed to preset the prices and
invoicing currency one period ahead by maximizing its expected prots with a discount
productivity disadvantages. The price-adjusted productivity, ai=(SQ=Q), captures the advantage of a
unit of home currency spent on the foreign variety relative to the home variety. This term also relates
to the denition of quality by Grossman and Helpman (1993) as the advantage in services provided by
a good relative to its cost.
15Fixed costs can explain the fact that some rms do not import foreign inputs. The model can be
extended to incorporate a set of di¤erentiated intermediate goods, such that xed costs play a role in
determining the optimal choice of the cut-o¤ set. This extension does not change the models predictions
on currency choice.
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factor .16 If the rm sets its price in the home currency (i.e., PCP), then the expected
discounted prots are
EPCPi (pi) = E
24 (pi   i)
 
pi
SP hf
! 
P hf
P 
 
D
35 : (6)
If the rm sets its price in the foreign currency (i.e., LCP), then the expected discounted
prots are
ELCPi (p

i ) = E
24 (Spi   i)
 
pi
P hf
! 
P hf
P 
 
D
35 : (7)
The prot-maximizing prices under PCP and LCP, respectively, are
pi =

  1 
E
 
i  S


E (S
)
; (8)
pi =

  1 
E (i  
)
E (S
)
; (9)
where 
 = P ( )hf P
D: By substituting these optimal prices into the two expected
prot functions and taking a second-order approximation, I obtain the rms decision
rule for invoicing currency choice. A domestic rm using foreign inputs sets its price for
the foreign market in PCP if
1
2
var (lnS) >


cov [ln (1   i) ; lnS] ; (10)
and in LCP if vice versa. This decision rule states that all else being equal, exchange
rate volatility makes the rm prefer PCP. In contrast, the covariance between exchange
rates and the home share of inputs (1  i) makes the rm prefer LCP. The former e¤ect
captures the rms consideration of expected revenues, whereas the latter captures the
consideration of expected costs. I discuss the two e¤ects in turn.
Exchange rate volatility on the left-hand side of (10) enters the decision rule through
the rms consideration of expected revenues. When the rm chooses PCP, the price is
certain, and the quantity (foreign demand) is subject to exchange rate uncertainty. In
contrast, when the rm chooses LCP, the quantity is certain, and the price is subject
to exchange rate uncertainty. Hence, the rm faces a trade-o¤ between stabilizing price
and stabilizing quantity. In this case, the curvature of the revenue functions matters
for the optimal currency choice. Technically, the expected revenue function under PCP
16Note that the expectation occurs in period t  1 when the rm sets its price for period t. The time
subscripts are omitted for simplicity.
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is convex in the exchange rate and linear under LCP.17 Therefore, the model predicts
that an increase in the exchange rate variance increases the expected revenues under
PCP relative to LCP, a nding that is consistent with Devereux et al. (2004) and Engel
(2006).
The covariance between exchange rates and the home share of inputs on the right-
hand side of (10) enters the decision rule through the rms consideration of expected
costs. For example, if the home currency depreciates (higher S), foreign inputs become
more expensive, leading to a higher marginal cost. In this case, the rm incurs a cost
from switching from imported inputs to domestic inputs (higher 1  i). The covariance
term is positive and captures the rms responsiveness to input price uncertainty. All else
being equal, a more responsive rm has a stronger incentive to choose LCP. Additionally,
this e¤ect is stronger if the domestic and foreign inputs are less substitutable (with a
lower elasticity of substitution ).
To determine the link between the degree of dependence on imported inputs and in-
voicing currency choice, I rewrite the right-hand side of (10) in terms of the productivity-
enhancing e¤ect bi using equation (5): R:H:S =  cov (ln bi; lnS) : Next, I prove that
this term is positive and increasing in the degree of dependence on imported inputs  i
because @ ln bi=@ lnS =   i < 0: These results suggest that a rm with a higher  i
is more responsive to exchange rate uncertainty and, hence, more likely to use LCP.
Intuitively, when costs are incurred in the foreign currency, choosing LCP provides a
natural hedge for the rm. However, note that the result holds for risk-neutral rms in
the model.
Through these discussions, I summarize the theoretical results in Proposition 1 and
formulate its corollary as follows.
Proposition 1 A domestic rm that depends more on foreign currency-denominated
inputs is more likely to use LCP (relative to PCP) for exports.
Corollary (to Proposition 1) A domestic rm with a higher share of imported inputs
denominated in the home currency is less likely to use LCP (relative to PCP) for exports.
Note that in the model, exchange rates only a¤ect the rms total costs through
using imported inputs denominated in the foreign currency. Therefore, for rms that do
not use imported inputs ( i = 0), the decision rule for PCP in equation (10) now reads
var (lnS) > 0: This result implies a dominant PCP for rms that do not use imported
inputs, a pattern that I document in the descriptive statistics in Section 3. This model
prediction is summarized as Proposition 2.
17The expected revenue functions are E
h
pi
 
pi=SP

hf
   
P hf=P
 Di under PCP and
E
h
Spi
 
pi =P

hf
   
P hf=P
 Di under LCP.
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Proposition 2 Given any exchange rate volatility, rms that do not use imported inputs
are more likely to use PCP for exports, everything else being equal.
3 Data and Stylized Facts
In this section, I start by describing the dataset used for the empirical analysis. Next,
I provide a broad assessment of the currency denomination of UK trade, followed by
the stylized facts about importing exporters (i.e., rms that use imported inputs) and
non-importing exporters.
The main data source is a highly disaggregated dataset of UK trade from HMRC,
which is only available to approved projects. The sample used in this paper includes all
UK trade transactions outside the euro zone in 2011.18 For each trade transaction, I
observe a unique trader identier, the country of dispatch (for imports) or destination
(for exports), product code, industry code, statistical value, and the invoicing currency
of the transaction. After dropping observations with no information on invoicing cur-
rency, the remaining sample accounts for 95.1 percent of total imports (7.31 million
observations) and 86.3 percent of total exports (2.54 million observations).
Arguably, one advantage of the UK trade data is the diversity in trading partners. In
2011, the total number of trading partners was approximately 190 for both imports and
exports. The main partners are the US which represents 16 percent of imports and 29
percent of exports and China which accounts for 15 percent of imports and 6 percent
of exports.19 This dataset ensures that the analysis in this paper fairly represents a
small open economy in international trade rather than a special case with only a few
trading partners.
3.1 A Broad Assessment of the Currency Denomination of UK Trade
Interestingly, the number of currencies used in UK trade is quite high, with 76 currencies
used for exports and 103 for imports. However, when considering trade value, major
currencies such as the pound sterling and the US dollar still dominate as an invoicing
currency. Table 1 displays these trade shares and the shares in terms of pricing strategies
(PCP, LCP, and VCP). I rst observe an asymmetry in the currency denomination of
exports and imports: the dominant currency for imports is the US dollar (64.7 percent),
18The full HMRC dataset covers complete UK trade transactions between 1996 and 2013. Declaring
the invoicing currency became a requirement after 2010 for non-EU imports and after 2011 for exports
(for transaction value greater than £ 100; 000). In 2011, non-EU imports accounted for 49.5 percent of
the total UK imports and non-EU exports accounted for 46.5 percent of the total UK exports.
19These 190 trading partners include countries and autonomous areas, such as Hong Kong. Other
main partners are East and Southeast Asia (25 percent of imports and 21 percent of exports) and Europe
excluding EU countries (21 percent of imports and 26 percent of exports).
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Table 1: Currency of Invoicing in UK Trade with non-EU Countries
 Imports Exports  
Shares of Currency Choice (percent)  
Pound Sterling (£) 24.5 57.4  
US dollar ($) 64.7 37.1  
Euro (€) 5.3 2.8  
Others                 5.5 2.7  
Sum 100.0 100.0  
    
Shares of Pricing Strategy (percent)  
Producer Currency Pricing (PCP) 18.8 57.4(£)  
Local Currency Pricing (LCP) 24.5(£) 14.0  
Vehicle Currency Pricing (VCP) 56.7 28.6  
Sum 100.0 100.0  
 
whereas exports are primarily priced in pounds (57.4 percent).20 The euro accounts for
a small share because the data do not include trade with EU countries. I also report
that VCP is the main strategy for imports, whereas the dominant one for exports is
PCP. As previously discussed, the US represents only a small share of UK trade; hence,
the US dollar is clearly used extensively as a vehicle currency.
As reported in Table 2, the data further reveal that the asymmetry in the currency
denomination of exports and imports holds for all industries, trading partners, and
the categories of goods.21 For both exports and imports, I also observe a signicant
variation in invoicing currency across industries, trading partners, and the categories of
goods. For example, in Panel A of Table 2, it can be seen that the share of exports
priced in pounds is approximately 55 percent for the manufacturing industry (SITC 6),
whereas the share is nearly 70 percent for the food industry (SITC 0). Panel B of Table
2 displays a comparison between trading partners, and shows that almost all imports
from the US are priced in dollars (82.6 percent). Additionally, imports from East and
Southeast Asia have the highest trade share priced in pounds (42.3 percent) compared
with other destinations. Regarding exports, half of the exports to the US are priced
in dollars (47.2 percent), whereas exports to other destinations are primarily priced in
pounds.
Next, I categorize goods into nal, intermediate, and capital goods according to the
Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classication.22 As shown in Panel C of Table 2, LCP
20This pattern is at odds with the Swedish evidence reported in Friberg and Wilander (2008) that
exporters primarily use their customerscurrencies.
21The classications used are the Standard International Trade Classication (SITC) and the Broad
Economic Categories (BEC).
22The trade shares of nal, intermediate, and capital goods for imports in 2011 are 24, 58, and 14
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Table 2: Currency of Invoicing by Industry, Destination, and Category of Goods
 
Imports Exports 
PCP LCP(£) VCP PCP(£) LCP VCP 
Panel A: By 1-digit SITC Industry (percent)       
0:Food & live animals 10.5 37.7 51.8 68.0 10.4 21.5 
1:Beverages & tobacco 19.0 68.0 12.9 48.4 33.6 18.1 
2:Crude materials 30.5 30.9 38.5 65.5 2.4 32.0 
3:Mineral fuels 2.7 9.7 87.6 65.0 19.3 15.7 
4:Animal & veg. oils 10.6 3.6 85.8 77.9 6.6 15.5 
5:Chemicals 32.0 33.8 34.2 54.7 28.8 16.5 
6:Manufactured goods 10.2 20.5 69.3 54.8 8.6 36.6 
7:Machinery 24.8 29.6 45.6 58.6 14.1 27.4 
8:Miscellaneous 14.8 36.5 48.7 65.5 15.5 19.0 
9:Unclassified 37.3 0.7 62.0 50.7 0.5 48.8 
Panel B: By Trading Partners (percent)       
US 82.6 15.6 1.8 50.2 47.2 2.7 
China 0.3 26.0 73.8 62.4 0.1 37.5 
East/Southeast Asia 6.4 42.3 51.2 57.3 5.9 36.8 
Europe exc. EU   4.6 21.8 73.6 75.5 2.8 21.6 
Other Americas          10.9 24.9 64.2 53.4 7.8 38.8 
All Others 3.7 21.9 74.4 63.5 1.9 34.6 
Panel C: By The BEC Category (percent)       
Final Goods 10.7 41.2 48.1 56.3 27.2 16.5 
Intermediate Goods 18.6 20.1 61.3 56.6 15.8 27.6 
Capital Goods 21.4 25.2 53.4 59.3 13.2 27.5 
Notes: The classifications used are the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) and the Broad 
Economic Categories (BEC). 
is used more extensively for nal goods relative to intermediate and capital goods (in
value), particularly for imports. This nding is consistent with the theoretical argument
in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) that nal goods producers are more prone to use
LCP given local competition compared with intermediate goods exporters.23
3.2 Stylized Facts About Importing and Non-importing Exporters
In the following discussion, I categorize UK exporters into two groups according to their
import behavior: importing exporters use imported inputs and non-importing exporters
do not.24 Out of all 58,907 rms in the exports dataset, 32,289 rms (55 percent) are
importing exporters and 26,618 (45 percent) are non-importing exporters. As reported
in Table 3, importing exporters account for a much larger share of export value (89.5
percent, respectively. The gures are 18, 57, and 16 percent for exports. Some goods are not classied
by the BEC and account for only 3.7 percent of imports and 9 percent of exports.
23 In their model, all exports are intermediate goods sold to domestic nal goods producers.
24Foreign inputs imported by importing exporters account for 63.4 percent of all the UK imported
inputs. The remainder is imported by rms that sell to only domestic markets.
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Table 3: Importing versus Non-importing Exporters
 
Importing Non-importing 
Share in export value (percent) 89.5 10.5 
   
Number of firms 32,289 26,618 
Fraction of firms (percent) 55.0   45.0 
Number of firms with export value in the top 5
th
 percentile 2,568 377 
   
Fraction of firms by pricing strategy (percent) 
All PCP (£)              49.9 75.4 
All LCP 2.2 2.5 
All VCP 3.5 8.0 
Mix of two or more strategies 44.4 14.0 
Sum 100.0 100.0 
 
percent) compared with non-importing exporters (10.5 percent). Although importing
exporters are on average larger exporters, note that very large exporters are also found in
the non-importing group. Within this group, the number of exporters with export shares
in the upper 5th percentile is 377 (1.4 percent of non-importing exporters), whereas the
importing group has 2,568 very large exporters (8 percent of importing exporters).
A salient and new stylized fact in the UK data is that importing exporters and non-
importing exporters exhibit very di¤erent patterns of invoicing currency choice. Table
3 indicates that a large share of non-importing exporters (75.4 percent) only use PCP,
whereas this gure is only 49.9 percent for importing exporters, a pattern consistent
with the theoretical prediction that non-importing rms are more likely to use PCP
(see Proposition 2). Additionally, a larger share of non-importing exporters (8 percent)
uses only VCP, as opposed to 3.5 percent for importing exporters. More interestingly,
only 14 percent of non-importing exporters use a combination of two or three strategies,
as opposed to 44 percent for importing exporters.25
A natural question is whether the di¤erence in invoicing currency choice between
the two groups is primarily driven by rm characteristics, such as import behavior as
suggested by the theory or by other fundamental di¤erences at more aggregated levels.
Table 4 presents these two groupsexport shares (in value) by industry presence, destina-
tion, and the category of goods. That no substantial heterogeneity in export sectors and
destinations between importing and non-importing exporters exists is somehow surpris-
ing and highlights that the variation in invoicing currency choice is more likely to come
from rm characteristics. Furthermore, a comparison between the shares of di¤erent
goods shows that importing exporters have a higher share of intermediate goods, which
suggests the evidence of their engagement in vertical specialization in global production
25Within the mixed group, the average value shares of PCP, LCP, and VCP are 60, 16, and 24 percent
for importing rms and 59, 15, and 26 percent for non-importing rms.
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Table 4: Importing versus Non-importing Exporters by Industry, Destination, and Cat-
egory of Goods
 
Importing Non-importing 
Shares of exports by 1-digit SITC Industry (percent) 
0:Food & live animals 1.2 5.7 
1:Beverages & tobacco 2.8 1.9 
2:Crude materials 2.9 6.2 
3:Mineral fuels 7.4 1.8 
4:Animal & veg. oils 0.1 0.04 
5:Chemicals 17.6 21.5 
6:Manufactured goods 12.2 8.6 
7:Machinery 41.6 40.4 
8:Miscellaneous 12.1 13.1 
9:Unclassified 2.1 0.8 
Sum 100.0 100.0 
Shares of Exports by Destination (percent) 
  US 28.6 31.1
China 6.3 7.2 
East/Southeast Asia 22.5 27.8 
Europe exc. EU   16.4 14.1 
Other Americas          9.0 5.1 
All Others 17.2 14.7 
Sum 100.0 100.0 
Shares of Exports by the BEC Category (percent) 
Final Goods 17.6 25.0 
Intermediate Goods 58.6 41.7 
Capital Goods 16.0 13.2 
N/A 7.8 20.2 
Sum 100.0 100.0 
 
chains.
To summarize, I provide the descriptive statistics of the currency denomination of
UK trade and document substantial variations in invoicing currency choice between
importing and non-importing exporters. Next, guided by the theory, I formally examine
the role of imported inputs in determining exportersinvoicing currency choice.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I rst introduce the main empirical specication and the construction of
variables that are linked to the propositions developed in Section 2. Next, I present the
main empirical results. I conclude this section with a series of robustness tests.
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4.1 Empirical Specication and Construction of Variables
I take the entire sample of UK exports to non-EU countries (2.54 million transactions)
and reduce it to the rm-product-destination level (0.65 million observations). The
dimension that is eliminated is the frequency of shipping for each exporter (at the
product-destination level) within a year.26
The categorical dependent variables take into account all pricing strategies, includ-
ing PCP (the default option), LCP, and VCP. The regressions are estimated using a
multinomial logit (MNL) procedure that imposes the constraint that the three invoicing
alternatives are mutually exclusive and exhaustive (for each rm-product-destination
observation). Thus, the MNL estimations yield two sets of results: LCP versus PCP
and VCP versus PCP. Statistical signicance in these estimations shows the direction
in which the explanatory variables shift the likelihood of LCP (VCP) away from the
default option of PCP. The main estimating specication is
i;j;c (PCP ) = MNL

InputPCP i;c; InputLCP i; Importi; ratioi;k; c; k

;
where the superscripts i; j; c and k denote rm, product, destination (country), and
industry, respectively.
The rst explanatory variable InputPCP i;c measures the share of rm i0s imported
inputs from country c priced in country cs currency (i.e., PCP from the perspective
of the exporter). This variable can be interpreted as rm is e¤ectivedependence on
imported inputs from country c. A higher ratio of InputPCP i;c is expected to increase
the likelihood of LCP relative to PCP, as predicted by Proposition 1.27
Furthermore, I consider a rm-level measure InputLCP i that captures the total
share of rm is pound-denominated imported inputs. This variable is a systematic
measure of the overall degree of input price uncertainty facing exporters. For exam-
ple, suppose an exporter uses inputs from both the US (denominated in dollars) and
Japan (denominated in yen) and then produces a nal good that it sells to the US.
The variable InputPCP i;c only captures the dollar-denominated inputs, whereas the
variable InputLCP i takes into account all other input sources. A higher InputLCP i is
expected to decrease the likelihood of LCP relative to PCP, as predicted by the corollary
of Proposition 1.
26On average, rms ship four times a year. The reason for collapsing the data is to avoid assigning
more weights to rms that ship more regularly.
27Note that Proposition 1 is built on equation (10) where  captures imported inputs as a share of
total costs. Total costs may be measured as total wage bill plus total material cost, as used in Amiti et al.
(2014). When data on costs are not available, sales may serve as a good proxy. However, the UK dataset
used in this paper is limited in the available rm characteristics and hence the variable InputPCP i;c
does not fully correspond to the theory. Instead, it distinguishes the exporters dependence on imported
inputs from a particular trading partner in an environment of multiple export destinations, an aspect
not explored in the theory.
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To distinguish between importing and non-importing exporters, I use a dummy vari-
able Importi, which takes the value of one if a rm uses imported inputs and zero
otherwise. The use of imported inputs is expected to increase the likelihood of LCP
relative to PCP, as predicted by Proposition 2.
Guided by the stylized fact documented in Section 3 that importing rms account for
a large export share, I further control for relative rm size proxied by ratioi;k, the export
share of rm i in an HS-4-digit industry.28 I start the estimations with destination xed
e¤ects c (at the area level) and industry xed e¤ects k (at the SITC-1-digit level) and
later replace them with destination-industry e¤ects c;k.29
4.2 Main Empirical Findings
To focus on testing the theoretical predictions, I only report the estimation results for
the pair of LCP versus PCP in Table 5, but note that the choice of VCP is also taken into
account in the MNL regressions.30 In columns 1 to 4 of Table 5, the estimates from the
MNL regressions are odd ratios rather than marginal e¤ects; therefore, I rst interpret
the estimated coe¢ cients in terms of the direction of predictions. The magnitudes of
these e¤ects are then discussed, with column 5 and column 6 showing the consistent
pairwise estimates.
Column 1 reports an unexplained prominence in PCP relative to LCP for UK ex-
ports, as the negative coe¢ cient implies. In column 2, I include the main variables
related to rms use of imported inputs. The positive and signicant coe¢ cient of
InputPCP i;c implies that a higher share of imported inputs denominated in the trading
partners currency makes it more likely that rms use the same currency for exports
(i.e., LCP is more likely), which supports Proposition 1. The estimated coe¢ cient of
InputLCP i is signicantly negative, which suggests that rms with a higher share of in-
puts denominated in pounds are more likely to shift from LCP to PCP (see the corollary
of Proposition 1). Lastly, the e¤ect of the dummy variable Importi is also signicant.
As documented in the descriptive statistics section (see Table 3), rms using imported
inputs are less likely to use PCP, which supports Proposition 2. Overall, these results
strongly support the models predictions.
In column 3, I add an extra control for rm size in terms of export share. The
positive and signicant coe¢ cient of ratioi;k suggests that larger exporters are more
likely to price in their trading partners currencies. One possible explanation is that
28HS code stands for the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. Other proxies
such as export shares at the SITC-1-digit level and total export shares yield the same predictions.
29Destinations at the area level include the US, China, East/Southeast Asia, Europe (excluding the
EU), other American countries and all other countries. Using more disaggregated levels of industry
e¤ects (at the SITC-5-digit) or destination e¤ects (at the country level) does not change the results.
30Full regression results including the pair of VCP versus PCP are reported in Table A1 in the Online
Appendix. Also, see Table A2 for the results without xed e¤ects.
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Table 5: Imported Inputs and Invoicing Currency Choice for UK Exporters
Dependent Variable:  
LCP vs. PCP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(5) 
Binomial 
logit 
(6) 
Binomial  
logit (ME) 
InputPCP
i,c
  0.25*** 0.27*** 0.88*** 0.29*** 0.02*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) 
InputLCP
i
  -0.40*** -0.42*** -0.35*** -0.42*** -0.03*** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.07) (0.07) 
Import
i
  0.78*** 0.75*** 0.59*** 0.74*** 0.05*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) 
ratio
i.k
   1.33***  1.34*** 0.09*** 
   (0.14)  (0.13) (0.13) 
Constant -0.93*** -1.60*** -1.64*** -1.46*** -1.72*** 0.09*** 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.00) (0.17) (0.17) 
Fixed effects:       
   δc + δk Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
   δc,k No No No Yes No No 
Observations 644,704 644,704 644,704 644,704 507,723 507,723 
AIC - 832,915 830,029 969,895 - - 
Pseudo-R
2
 - 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.31 0.31 
Notes: Observations are at the firm-product-destination level. Columns 1 to 4 present the results in terms of odds 
ratios from the main multinomial logit specification. The default option is PCP and only estimates of LCP versus 
PCP are reported. Column 5 shows pairwise estimates from a binomial logit regression. Column 6 reports the 
average of the individual marginal effects from the pairwise regression. Fixed effects: δc are destinations at the area 
level include the US, China, East/Southeast Asia, Europe (excluding the EU), other American countries, and all 
other countries; δk are industries defined at the SITC-1-digit level; δc,k are industry-destination effects at the SITC-
2-digit-area level. Standard errors are clustered at the HS4 level (1,191 clusters) and are reported in parentheses. 
Alternative clustering at the SITC-5-digit level, at the firm level and at the country level yield the same conclusions.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
larger rms highly involved in international trade have more incentives and resources
to hedge against exchange rate uncertainty using nancial instruments; hence, they
are more likely to deviate from PCP.31 The coe¢ cients of the key variables are almost
identical to those in column 2.
Next, in column 4, I report the results of the same specication as in column 2
but replace the industry- and destination-specic e¤ects with industry-destination xed
e¤ects (dened at the SITC-2-digit-area level) to explore di¤erent levels of variation.
Comparing column 4 with column 2, I show that the coe¢ cient of InputPCP i;c more
than triples and remains strongly signicant. All the other estimates do not change
much in size and also remain strongly signicant. However, a much lower pseudo R-
square in this specication indicates that it does not t the data as well as the main
specication.
31Another proxy for rmsengagement in international trade is the number of exporting destinations.
In the robustness section, I further split the sample by the number of destinations and discuss the e¤ects
of the key variables for each group.
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Column 5 reports the pairwise logit estimates for the pair of LCP versus PCP,
dropping the observations of VCP. If the implicit assumption of the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) in the MNL procedure holds, estimating a pairwise logit
model should yield the same results as estimating a multinomial logit model.32 A
comparison of column 5 with column 3 indicates that the coe¢ cients are almost identical,
suggesting consistent MNL estimates in the main specication.
Column 6 quanties the main results by reporting the average marginal e¤ects of the
key variables (as in column 5). Specically, a 10 percentage point higher InputPCP i;c
is associated with a 20 percentage point higher probability of LCP. Furthermore, a rm
with the share of pound-denominated inputs at the 75th percentile (or the upper quartile
where InputLCP i = 13:17 percent) is approximately 40 percent (=  0:03  13:17) less
likely to use LCP relative to PCP, compared with a rm whose imported inputs are
all priced in foreign currencies (InputLCP i = 0). Finally, the predicted probability of
LCP relative to PCP for importing exporters is 5 percent higher than non-importing
exporters.33
Overall, the main empirical ndings in Table 5 provide strong support for the theo-
retical predictions developed in Section 2. However, I want to ensure that these results
are not driven by outliers or specic to rms facing a particular range of input price
uncertainty. I re-estimate the (pairwise) binomial logit specication in columns 5 and
6 of Table 5 for importing exporters by splitting the ratio InputLCP i into quartiles.
Specically, importing exporters are further divided into three groups: high InputLCP
(with the ratio in the upper quartile), medium InputLCP (below the upper quartile and
above the median) and low InputLCP (at the median).34 With this split, the high group
accounts for 31.4 percent of the export share of all importing rms, the medium group
accounts for 50.5 percent, and the low group accounts for only 18.1 percent. I report
the average marginal e¤ects in columns 1 to 3 of Table 6. These estimated coe¢ cients
conrm that the main ndings remain valid for all three groups.
Finally, I close this section with an extra exercise to link the empirical analysis to
the theoretical assumption in Section 2 that all imported inputs are denominated in
the foreign currency (i.e., PCP from the perspective of exporters). To see whether the
results from the main specication respond well to this assumption, in column 4 of Table
6 I consider only observations with exporters whose imported inputs are all priced in
PCP.35 For instance, exports to Japan from rm i are included if rm i0s imported
32This is a test rst proposed by Hausman and McFadden (1984).
33Note that these results apply to the pairwise comparison of PCP versus LCP. For more quantitative
interpretations with di¤erent specications see Section 4.3.3.
34Note that the lower two quartiles are grouped together because the median level is at zero. Hence,
for the low group the variable InputLCP i is dropped.
35This sample contains exports from 10,914 rms that account for approximately 9.1 percent of the
total export share.
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Table 6: Invoicing Currency Choice by Input Currency Denomination
Dependent Variable:  
LCP vs. PCP 
(1) 
High 
InputLCP 
(2) 
Medium 
InputLCP 
(3) 
Low 
InputLCP 
(4) 
PCP Inputs 
Only 
(5) 
LCP Inputs 
Only 
InputPCP
i,c
 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.01***  —  — 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.04)   
InputLCP
i
 -0.03*** -0.15***  — -0.05*** -0.02*** 
 (0.09) (0.09)  (0.09) (0.21) 
ratio
i.k
 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.23*** 0.07*** 
 (0.24) (0.20) (0.28) (0.17) (0.56) 
Constant 0.08*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.36*** 0.03*** 
 (0.56) (0.18) (0.18) (0.29) (0.63) 
Fixed effects: δc + δk Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 149,278 135,782 123,335 48,572 18,144 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.05 0.15 
Notes: In columns 1 to 3, firms are sorted by the ratio InputLCPi into above the 75th percentile (or the upper 
quartile of 13.17 percent), between the upper quartile and above the median level at zero, and at the median level. 
Column 4 uses a subsample with exporters whose imported inputs (from the trading partner to whom they export) 
are all priced in PCP. Column 5 considers exporters whose imported inputs (from the trading partner to whom 
they export) are all priced in LCP. Other details of clustered standard errors and fixed effects are as in Table 5. 
inputs from Japan are all priced in Japanese yen. The variable InputPCP i;c is dropped
because it no longer captures input currency denomination but the trade share of a
trading partner c. The coe¢ cient of InputLCP i reported in column 4 shows that the
probability of LCP signicantly decreases with the share of pound-denominated inputs,
thus again consistent with the theoretical prediction (see the corollary of Proposition
1). Similarly, in column 5, I consider only observations with exporters whose imported
inputs are all priced in LCP, and the e¤ect of input currency denomination remains
strongly signicant.36
To summarize, I nd that the e¤ects of input currency denomination on invoicing
currency choice are signicant across rms facing di¤erent degrees of (bilateral) input
price uncertainty. Even for exporters that use all PCP inputs or all LCP inputs (at
the rm-country level), the overall currency exposure in the portfolios matters for their
invoicing currency choice.
4.3 Robustness
I consider three sets of robustness tests: including other theoretical determinants as
additional controls, considering an alternative proxy for rm size, and using alternative
specications and samples.
36This sample contains exports from 3,810 rms that account for approximately 3 percent of the total
export share. Note that some rms may appear in both subsamples discussed in this exercise, because
the observations are at the level of rm-country pairs.
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4.3.1 Additional Controls
In Table 7, I check whether the main results are robust to adding a number of other theo-
retical determinants for invoicing currency choice. These include a set of macroeconomic
factors, a set of strategic factors, and several controls for goods characteristics.
The results reported in column 1 of Table 7 show that the estimated coe¢ cients of
the main variables are virtually the same as in Table 5 after the inclusion of several
macroeconomic factors. First, exchange rate volatility is proxied by the coe¢ cients
of variation of the importers currency value relative to the pound and the US dollar
during 2006-2009.37 As the value of the pound was highly volatile during this period,
it is expected that the coe¢ cients of variation of exchange rates against the dollar
better capture the volatility of a currencys value. The negative coe¢ cient of cvUSDc
indicates that exporters are more likely to use PCP when selling to a country with a
more volatile currency value against the dollar, a nding consistent with the theory of
Devereux et al. (2004) and Engel (2006). Further, I add two dummy variables to capture
exchange rate pegs with respect to the dollar and the euro, denoted byDpegc and Epegc;
respectively.38 Exporters are more likely to use PCP relative to LCP when exporting to
countries with exchange rate pegs. The last factor included is the transaction costs of
exchange, proxied by the variable FXc, which captures the share of a countrys currency
in the daily global foreign exchange market turnover.39 A higher turnover implies lower
transaction costs. The ndings reveal that a higher share of market turnover increases
the probability of LCP. This result implies that a currency that is traded extensively
with lower transaction costs is more likely to be used as an invoicing currency, thus
consistent with the theory of Devereux and Shi (2013).40
Column 2 veries that the coe¢ cients of the main variables are hardly a¤ected after
controlling for rms strategic considerations, specically, rms bargaining power as
emphasized by Goldberg and Tille (2008). I consider rm experience using the variable
fiveyroldi to capture whether an exporter has more than ve years of experience in
exporting. Although the coe¢ cient for the pair of VCP versus PCP (not reported) is
signicant, no signicance exists for the pair of LCP versus PCP. On the importers
side, Goldberg and Tille (2009) suggest transaction size as a proxy for the importers
bargaining power, because importer characteristics are not normally observed in trade
statistics. I use a dummy variable Top10i;j;c to capture whether a transaction is in the
37The variables are computed with the IMFs monthly exchange rates data from the International
Financial Statistics series rf .
38The denitions follow the IMFs classication in 2007. The various types of pegs include: (a)
no separate legal tender; (b) pre announced peg or currency board arrangement; (c) pre announced
horizontal band narrower than or equal to 2 percent; and (d) de facto peg.
39The data are reported in the BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey, including 35 major currencies in
2007. Currencies not listed in the survey are assigned a zero share.
40Also see, among others, Swoboda (1968) and Rey (2001) for previous research on the role of curren-
cies as a medium of exchange.
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Table 7: Robustness with Additional Controls
Dependent Variable: 
LCP vs. PCP 
(1) 
Macro  
Factors 
(2) 
Strategic 
Factors 
(3) 
Macro & 
Strategic 
(4) 
Homogene
-ous Goods 
(5) 
Differentiat 
-ed Goods 
(6) 
All  
Controls 
InputPCP
i,c
 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.26*** -0.17 0.26*** 0.24*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) 
InputLCP
i
 -0.40*** -0.43*** -0.39*** -0.22 -0.42*** -0.40*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.21) (0.05) (0.04) 
Import
i
 0.78*** 0.75*** 0.74*** 0.31** 0.77*** 0.72*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.03) 
ratio
i.k
   1.00*** 0.23 1.47*** 1.00*** 
   (0.15) (0.24) (0.22) (0.15) 
—Macroeconomic Factors—       
cvGBP
c
 6.25***  6.38*** 7.38*** 6.73*** 6.41*** 
 (0.50)  (0.41) (0.48) (0.41) (0.49) 
cvUSD
c
 -1.64***  -1.70*** 0.48 -1.97*** -1.67*** 
 (0.43)  (0.41) (0.84) (0.42) (0.12) 
Dpeg
c
 -0.63***  -0.65*** -0.92*** -0.61*** -0.64*** 
 (0.06)  (0.06) (0.81) (0.06) (0.06) 
Epeg
c
 -1.96***  -1.98*** -1.28*** -1.79*** -1.98*** 
 (0.34)  (0.34) (0.37) (0.33) (0.34) 
FX
c
 0.04***  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
—Strategic Factors—       
fiveyrold
i
  0.00 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.00 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.13) (0.03) (0.02) 
Top10
i,j,c
  0.38*** 0.36*** 0.15 0.35*** 0.36*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.13) (0.03) (0.02) 
—Goods Characteristics—       
Differentiated vs. Heterogeneous      -0.14* 
     (0.02) 
Final vs. Intermediate      -0.09 
     (0.09) 
       
Constant -5.47*** -1.63*** -5.57*** -5.35*** -5.24*** -5.51*** 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.21) (0.52) (0.10) (0.18) 
Fixed effects: δc + δk Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 644,704 644,704 644,704 12,207 555,336 644,704 
AIC 822,098 838,358 821,296 - - 819,164 
Pseudo-R2 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 
Notes: Columns 1 to 3 add additional controls. Columns 4 and 5 use subsamples of different types of goods, as 
defined in the Rauch (1999) product classification. Column 6 includes all controls. Other details of clustered 
standard errors and fixed effects are as in Table 5.  
top 10th percentile in value within an HS-4-digit industry. The ndings support the
theory of Goldberg and Tille (2008) that larger transactions are more likely to be priced
in the importers currency.
Arguably, rm size is also an indicator of exporters bargaining power, which is
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controlled for in the main analysis. Column 3 augments the specications in columns 1
and 2 together with the rm size variable ratioi;k: Overall, all these additional controls
have essentially no e¤ect on the estimated coe¢ cients of the main variables.
In columns 4 and 5, I examine the role of goods characteristics, particularly the sub-
stitutability of goods.41 I run separate regressions for both homogeneous goods (reported
in column 4) and heterogeneous goods (reported in column 5). With this split, I observe
that the e¤ects of input currency denomination (the coe¢ cients of InputPCP i;c and
InputLCP i) stop having any predictive power and disappear completely for homoge-
neous goods. This nding is somehow intuitive. As these goods are highly substitutable,
rms may simply follow what their competitors do or what their trading partners re-
quest. The coe¢ cient of rmsimport status is halved but remains strongly signicant.
The results reported in column 5 conrm that the main empirical ndings primarily
apply to heterogeneous goods.
In column 6, all additional controls previously discussed are included, and I further
add a Rauch variable (Di¤erentiated vs. Heterogeneous goods) and a variable that
captures the categories of goods (Final vs. Intermediate goods) to examine the e¤ects
across di¤erent types of goods. I rst verify that the e¤ects of the imported inputs
variables remain unchanged. The results also suggest that di¤erentiated goods are
more likely to be priced in PCP compared with homogeneous goods. This nding is
consistent with the theory of Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) that LCP is more likely
for homogeneous goods because exporters have a stronger incentive to stabilize prices in
the currency of their customers when demand is highly elastic. Furthermore, no evidence
exists that nal goods are more likely to be priced in LCP compared with intermediate
goods, as predicted by the model in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003). However, note
that this result is at odds with the evidence shown in Section 3. A possible explanation
for not nding the same result is that nal goods transactions are, on average, larger
in value than intermediate goods transactions. Another possible explanation is that
nal goods are shipped more frequently, a dimension that is eliminated when data are
collapsed.
4.3.2 Alternative Proxy for Firm Size
As highlighted in the data section, importing exporters are also large exporters, and
they exhibit very di¤erent patterns of invoicing currency choice compared with non-
importing exporters. The main empirical specication considers rm size in terms of
trade share and the results conrm that larger rms are less likely to use PCP.
To ensure that the main results do hold after controlling for the rm size e¤ect, in
41The classication is based on Rauch (1999), who categorizes three types of goods: Walrasian or
homogeneous, reference-priced, and di¤erentiated.
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this exercise I use the number of export destinations as an alternative proxy for rm size.
I sort all exporters by the number of export destinations into quartiles and re-estimate
the main specication for each of the four bins. With this split, exporters in Bin 1 export
to more than four destinations (above the upper quartile); the number of destinations
in Bin 2 is either three or four (between the upper quartile and the median); rms in
Bin 3 export to two destinations (between the median and the lower quartile), and rms
in Bin 4 only export to one destination (at the lower quartile).42 The regression results
are reported in Table A3 in the online Appendix.
In all cases, the main results are essentially unchanged, except that the e¤ect of over-
all currency exposure (InputLCP i) slightly loses its signicance in Bin 3 and disappears
in Bin 4. However, note that the overall currency exposure coincides with the bilateral
input denomination for exporters in Bin 4 because they have only one trading partner.
A comparison across columns also shows that the within-group e¤ect of bilateral input
denomination (InputPCP i;c) on exportersinvoicing currency choice is stronger when
the number of destination is lower. These ndings further suggest that the e¤ect of
import status remains relatively symmetric across bins except for the last one, which
has a third of the magnitude (with the odds ratio of 0.2 as opposed to 0.6).
To summarize, I verify that the main results are not specic to exportersactiveness
in the export markets. However, for very large rms exporting to multiple markets, the
(within-group) e¤ect of the overall currency exposure is stronger. In contrast, exporters
with only a few trading partners largely consider the bilateral exchange rate uncertainty
against their trading partnerscurrencies.
4.3.3 Alternative Samples and Specications
I further check the robustness of the main results within alternative subsamples of the
dataset. Overall, these results reported in Table A4 in the online Appendix reveal
the same qualitative patterns as the main ndings in Table 5.
As discussed in the data section, the US is a special case in which LCP (the US
dollar) is used extensively compared with other destinations. To address this concern,
in column 1 of Table A4, I exclude exports to the US from the sample. A comparison
with the main results indicates that, for this subsample, the e¤ect of InputPCP i;c is
signicantly stronger, whereas the e¤ect of InputLCP i is reduced by almost one-half.
In other words, the bilateral input currency denomination matters for rmscurrency
choice, particularly when trading with countries other than the US.
Next, I show in column 2 that dropping non-importing exporters has little e¤ect on
the estimated coe¢ cients in the main specication. Similarly, in column 3, I evaluate the
42The mean of the number of destinations is 3.97; the upper quartile, median quartile and lower
quartile are 4, 2, and 1, respectively. Export shares for the four bins are 0.89, 0.05, 0.03, and 0.03,
respectively.
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e¤ects for rms that use only imported inputs denominated in their trading partners
currency. Given that all observations with InputPCP i;c = 0 are dropped, I expect
the estimated coe¢ cient to decline in size and this is indeed conrmed by the results.
Column 4 considers only the manufacturing sector (SITC 6-8), and the e¤ects of the
main variables remain strongly signicant.43 Lastly, another concern is that the main
results are driven by rms with very large trade shares. In column 5, I exclude rms
with export shares in the top 5th percentile. Excluding large rms from the sample
slightly reduces the magnitude of the coe¢ cient of InputPCP i;c, consistent with the
ndings in the previous subsection with the number of export destinations as a proxy
for rm size. However, the predictions remain robust and strongly signicant.
Another set of robustness checks is to consider alternative specications and regres-
sion models. In the main analysis, the regression model is an MNL procedure that
includes VCP as a dependent variable. However, certain policy interests may focus only
on the prevalence of invoicing in the home currency. To this end, I further consider alter-
native regression models and specications using a dichotomous dependent variable that
captures whether a transaction is priced in pounds (nPCP = 0) or not (nPCP = 1).
These results are reported in Table A5 in the online Appendix.
The estimated (average) marginal e¤ects from a binomial logit regression are re-
ported in column 1 of Table A5. Column 2 reports the results from the same speci-
cation, but with a linear probability model instead. Overall, the qualitative predictions
are consistent with the results from the MNL specication. However, note that the
interpretations of these results are quite di¤erent from the main analysis because of
the dichotomous dependent variable. The ndings reported in columns 1 and 2 suggest
that importing exporters are approximately 8 to 14 percent more likely to use a foreign
currency (either LCP or VCP relative to PCP), compared with their non-importing
counterparts. Moreover, a one percent increase in a rms e¤ective dependence on for-
eign currency-denominated inputs (InputPCP i;c) increases the probability of switching
to a foreign currency from PCP by 9 to 12 percent. Finally, with a one percent increase
in a rms total share of inputs priced in pounds (InputLCP i), the predicted probability
of PCP relative to a foreign currency increases by approximately 18 percent.
Finally, column 3 uses a linear probability model with the full export dataset (2.54
million observations). The full dataset has many identical transactions at the rm-
product-destination level in di¤erent times of the year, which represent the dimension
of shipment frequency. Using the full dataset, I show that except for a downsized and
less signicant e¤ect of InputPCP i;c; all the main predictions remain unchanged.
43 In 2011, the UK manufactured goods accounted for approximately 56 percent of the total (non-EU)
exports.
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5 Extensions
In this section, I provide two extensions to the main analysis. The rst extension
theoretically and empirically considers the case of VCP. The second extension examines
the currency denomination of UK imports and provides country-level evidence of the
e¤ect of imported inputs on invoicing currency choice.
5.1 Imported Inputs and Vehicle Currency Pricing
5.1.1 Theory: Decision Rule for VCP
I rst extend the model presented in Section 2 to allow for the use of VCP inputs and the
choice of VCP for exports. I consider a three-country environment in which country V s
currency is used as a vehicle currency. Firm i in country H (Home) sells a di¤erentiated
good to country F (Foreign). The CES demand curve and production functions are as
in Section 2. The only di¤erence is that rm i0s imported inputs are all denominated in
VCP. Thus, the parameter  i captures the rms dependence on VCP inputs.
The rm presets the prices and the invoicing currency one period in advance to
maximize the expected discounted prots under PCP, LCP, and VCP:
EPCPi = E
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where  is the marginal cost denominated in the home currency, Shv is the exchange
rate between currencies H and V (home currency price of the vehicle currency), Sfv
is the exchange rate between currency F and V (foreign currency price of the vehicle
currency), and pi is the rms price set in di¤erent currencies. All price indexes are
denominated in the vehicle currency. Other variables are as in Section 2.
Following the solution technique in Section 2, the rm sets its price in VCP if and
only if
1
2
var (sfv) > cov (shv; sfv) ; and (14)
 

cov (shv; ln (1   i)) >
1
2
var (shv) ; (15)
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where lower case s denotes the log of exchange rates. From conditions (14) and (15), I
develop the following proposition.44 The detailed proof is shown in Appendix B.
Proposition 3 A domestic rm is more likely to use VCP for exports with: (i) a higher
exchange rate volatility between the destination and vehicle currency, var (sfv) ; (ii) a
lower covariance between two exchange rates cov (shv; sfv) ; (iii) a higher share of VCP
inputs.45
5.1.2 Empirical Evidence of VCP
Now, I turn to provide the empirical evidence of VCP in the UK trade data. As in
the main analysis in Section 4, the estimating specication uses a multinomial logit
model with a categorical dependent variable that considers PCP, LCP, and VCP (the
default option). The full regression results are reported in Table 8, with each column
reporting two sets of results: PCP versus VCP and LCP versus VCP. Column 1 reports
the benchmark results. Columns 2 and 3 add additional controls, and the benchmark
results remain robust. Therefore, the following discussion focuses on the estimates in
column 1.
First, Proposition 3(i) predicts that a higher degree of exchange rate volatility be-
tween the destination and the vehicle currency increases the probability of VCP. How-
ever, I do not nd evidence supporting this model prediction because the coe¢ cients
of the variable cvUSDc, representing the coe¢ cients of variation of the exchange rates
between the importers currency and the dollar, appear insignicant.
Proposition 3(ii) suggests that a lower covariance between the two exchange rates
(pound/dollar and importers currency/dollar) increases the probability of VCP. How-
ever, the empirical evidence reported in column 1 points to the opposite result. The
negative estimated coe¢ cients of cov (e$$; ec$)
c imply that a higher covariance between
the two exchange rates shifts the rms choice toward VCP and away from both PCP
and LCP.
Proposition 3(iii) links input currency denomination with VCP choice. Similar to
the strategy used in the main analysis, I consider the variable InputV CP i;c; which
measures rm i0s share of inputs from country c priced in VCP. The negative coe¢ cients
show that a higher share of VCP inputs signicantly increases the probability of VCP.
Furthermore, I consider a rm-level measure InputUSDi; which captures the total share
of rm is dollar-denominated inputs. A higher share of dollar-denominated inputs also
44Note that all domestic rms face the same exchange rate volatility between the home currency and
the third country regardless of their trading partners; therefore, the term var (shv) does not appear in
the proposition.
45Similar to Proposition 1, this is because the covariance term cov (shv; ln (1   i)) is positive and
increasing in the degree of dependence on VCP inputs  i.
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Table 8: Imported Inputs and Vehicle Currency Pricing
Dependent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
PCP LCP PCP LCP PCP LCP 
cvUSD
c
 0.12 -0.24 0.15 -0.29 0.73 -1.84*** 
 (0.12) (0.41) (0.12) (0.40) (0.12) (0.38) 
Cov (e£$, ec$)
c
 
-0.06*** -0.29*** -0.06*** -0.29*** -0.07*** -0.26*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
InputVCP
i,c
 -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.41*** -0.75*** -0.46*** -0.42*** 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.10) 
InputUSD
i
 -0.84*** -0.25** -0.49*** -0.58** -0.84*** -0.27** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Import
i
   -0.34*** 0.61***   
   (0.05) (0.04)   
ratio
i.k
   -0.87*** 0.45***   
   (0.13) (0.16)   
Constant 4.20*** 2.95*** 4.30*** 2.68*** 0.48 -5.01*** 
 (0.25) (0.24) (0.32) (0.27) (0.32) (0.31) 
Other Controls:       
Macroeconomic Factors No No Yes 
Strategic Factors No No Yes 
Goods characteristics No No Yes 
Fixed Effects: δc + δk Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 642,334 642,334 642,334 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.15 0.16 0.16 
Notes: The default option is VCP. Other details are as in Table 5. 
signicantly increases the probability of VCP.46 Overall, the ndings are consistent with
Proposition 3(iii).
To summarize, although evidence exists that the use of VCP inputs make VCP more
likely, the empirical results do not fully support the theoretical predictions derived from
a three-country framework. One possible explanation is that in practice VCP may be
the result of industry-specic or destination-specic considerations, rather than rms
prot-maximizing choice.47 It may also be the case that the theory introduced is lacking
in some way and hence cannot reconcile all pricing strategies. This remains a challenge
for future research.
46Note that although the dependent variable VCP does not distinguish the US dollar from other
currencies, the majority of VCP is with the dollar. An alternative measure of InputV CP i (at the rm
level) yields the same results.
47For example, the BIS report of Kenen (2011) nds that more than 70 percent of Asian exports to
Japan in 2007 were invoiced in dollars. Other determinants of VCP in this aspect, such as the transaction
costs of exchange and a simple industry coalescing e¤ect, have been highlighted in the empirical studies
on the role of a vehicle currency in international trade. These determinants have been discussed and
controlled for in the empirical analysis.
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5.2 Imported Inputs and Invoicing Currency Choice: Country-level
Evidence
In this extension, I review the currency denomination of UK imports and examine the
e¤ect of imported inputs on currency denomination at a more aggregated level. The
main challenge of doing so is to systematically distinguish the degree of dependence on
imported inputs across di¤erent exporting countries. I use a measure of value added
to gross exports (VAX ratio) computed by Johnson and Noguera (2012) as a proxy
for a countrys (or an industrys) dependence on imported inputs. The concept of this
measure is that countries or industries with higher value added to gross exports are less
dependent on imported inputs. Therefore, higher VAX ratios are associated with lower
dependence on foreign inputs.
I take the full sample of the 2011 UK imports from non-EU countries (with 7.31
million transactions). As in the main analysis in Section 4, I use an MNL specication
and take PCP as the default option. The regression results are reported in Table 9. The
rst column includes only constant terms. The positive and signicant coe¢ cients show
an unexplained prominent use of LCP and VCP (relative to PCP) in UK imports.
In column 2, I add the VAX ratios at the country level, ranging from 0 to 1, to
capture the share of value-added exports in total exports.48 A higher VAX ratio (lower
dependence on imported inputs) is associated with lower probability of using PCP. This
result implies that countries that engage more in trade in intermediate goods use less of
their home currencies for exports. When I use further disaggregated VAX ratios at the
country-industry level, the result still holds.49
In column 3, I include several controls for macroeconomic factors and goods charac-
teristics. Although these results suggest lower predicted coe¢ cients of the VAX ratios,
they remain qualitatively robust and signicant. Further, I show that exchange rate
volatility proxied by the coe¢ cients of variation of the exporters currency value rel-
ative to the pound (cvGBP c) increases the probability of PCP relative to both LCP
and VCP. This result is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Devereux et al.
(2004) and Engel (2006). Imports from countries with exchange rate pegs (Dpegc and
Epegc) are more likely to be priced in LCP or VCP rather than the exporters currency.
The e¤ects of transaction costs in foreign exchange markets are also highly signicant,
implying that an exporters currency with lower transaction costs of exchange (higher
FXc) has a higher presence (i.e., PCP is more likely). Finally, nal goods in UK im-
ports are more likely to be priced in LCP relative to PCP compared with intermediate
48Johnson and Noguera (2012) calculate the VAX ratios for 94 countries and 57 sectors in 2004.
Countries not included in the list are assigned the regional average.
49These results are not reported. The VAX ratios at the country-industry level are computed by
Johnson and Noguera (2012), including 93 countries, 19 regions, and 57 sectors in the GSC codes.
These ratios are not published in their paper.
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Table 9: Imported Inputs and the Currency Denomination of UK Imports
Dependent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
LCP(£) VCP LCP(£) VCP LCP(£) VCP LCP(£) VCP 
VAX
c
   -8.65*** -12.91*** -1.68** -3.30*** -1.62** -3.44*** 
   (0.72)  (0.52) (0.73) (0.15) (0.71) (0.60) 
—Macroeconomic Factors—         
cvGBP
c
       -5.36*** -8.12*** -6.89*** -8.33*** 
       (1.76) (1.33) (1.63) (1.33) 
Dpeg
c
       0.98*** 1.86*** 0.60*** 1.66*** 
       (0.23) (0.27) (0.23) (0.27) 
Epeg
c
     1.11*** 0.70** 1.31*** 0.72** 
     (0.35) (0.30) (0.34) (0.29) 
FX
c
     -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 
     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
—Goods Characteristics—         
Final vs. Intermediate     0.49*** -0.37 0.60*** -0.10 
     (0.20) (0.15) (0.19) (0.16) 
—Industry Characteristics—         
Mktshare
k,c
       1.68*** 0.68 
       (0.39) (0.42) 
Top5
k
       -0.22*** 0.30*** 
       (0.08) (0.08) 
         
Constant 0.66*** 0.62*** 7.04*** 9.89*** 3.91*** 5.60*** 1.89*** 4.62*** 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.52) (0.37) (0.70) (0.54) (0.68) (0.74) 
Industry effects No No No Yes 
Observations (millions) 7.31 7.31 7.31 7.31 
AIC 15,507,253 14,238,974 10,437,866 10,275,217 
Pseudo-R
2
 - 0.082 0.327 0.340 
Notes: Observations are at the transaction level. The default option is PCP. Fixed effects: industries are defined at 
the SITC-1-digit level. Alternative fixed industry effects at the SITC-5-digit level yield the same conclusions. 
Standard errors are clustered at the HS-4-digit level (1,206 clusters) and are reported in parentheses.   
goods, a nding that supports the theoretical predictions of Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2003).
In column 4, the main results for VAX ratios remain virtually unchanged, after
controlling for two extra industry characteristics. The rst factor is the market share
of exporters (Mktsharek;c), which is the market share of country c in UK imports in
an HS-4-digit industry. This variable captures whether exporters from country c are
the main trading partners for UK importers. I nd evidence that the main trading
partners are more likely to use the pound (LCP) relative to their home currency (PCP).
The second variable added is a dummy for large transactions (Top5k), which takes the
value of one if a transaction falls in the top 5th percentile of transaction value in an
HS-4-digit industry. Interestingly, LCP is less likely than PCP, whereas VCP is more
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likely than PCP for larger transactions. These ndings indicate that transaction size
masks a signicant degree of heterogeneity in what it represents. For instance, larger
transaction size may indicate a larger exporter with stronger bargaining power, which
leads to more PCP. However, this e¤ect can be in the opposite direction and indicates
a larger importer.50 In addition, large rms may be more active in trading di¤erent
currencies in the nancial markets, which makes VCP more likely.
To summarize, by examining the currency denomination of UK imports, I document
a systematic nding that countries more involved in the global production chains are
more likely to deviate from using their home currencies for exports. The data strongly
support the theoretical prediction at a more aggregated level (see Proposition 1). Fur-
ther, the ndings suggest the importance of looking into rm characteristics rather than
using aggregated proxies so as to uncover the underlying determinants for the currency
denomination of international trade.
6 Concluding Remarks
Invoicing currency choice is an example of how micro-heterogeneity can inuence aggre-
gate outcomes. The paper documents rm-level variations in invoicing currency choice
using a detailed transaction-level dataset and relates rms invoicing currency choice
to their import behavior. The stylized facts documented in Section 3 are completely
new, and I view this as an important contribution to the vast literature on the currency
denomination of international trade.
Further, the paper develops rmsdecision rule for invoicing currency choice that
specically depends on the degree of import intensity. The rm-level and country-level
evidence from the UK data strongly supports the theoretical prediction that a higher
degree of dependence on imported inputs is associated with a deviation from using the
home currency.
The ndings in this paper have strong policy implications for the e¤ects of exchange
rates on trade prices. The recent exchange rate pass-through literature has identied
the link between import intensity and rm-level pass-through via the interactions with
markup adjustments. Large rms with higher import intensities tend to absorb more
exchange rate variations in their markups, resulting in lower pass-through into destina-
tion prices (Amiti et al., 2014). The ndings in this paper suggest another underlying
mechanism, namely exportersendogenous choice of invoicing currency according to the
degree of their import intensiveness. Large exporters with higher import intensities are
more likely to price their goods in a foreign currency (either LCP or VCP). As em-
phasized by Gopinath et al. (2010), in an environment of endogenous currency choice,
50 In Goldberg and Tille (2008, 2009), a larger transaction size is used as a proxy for stronger bargaining
power of the importers, which makes LCP more likely.
31
the ideal test is to relate rm-level characteristics that shape both markup variability
and cost sensitivity to invoicing currency decisions. A better understanding of these
variations is crucial to the development of the pass-through literature.
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Appendix A: Model Solutions
This appendix provides the detailed derivation of the model presented in Section 2. I
drop the subscript i for brevity. Given output Y , the rm minimizes its total cost:
min
L;X;Z;M
TC(Y ) =WL+QZ + SQM +Wf:
Denote by  and  the Lagrange multipliers on production constraints (2) and (3),
respectively. The rst-order conditions for cost minimization are as follows:
W =  (1  ) Y
L
; (A1)
 = 
Y
X
; (A2)
Q = 

X
Z
1=(1+)
; (A3)
SQ = 

aX
M
1=(1+)
: (A4)
Rearranging these conditions together with (3) gives
QX = Y
"
1 +

a
SQ=Q
#1=
: (A5)
Substituting (A5) and (A1) into (2), I solve for marginal cost :
 =
C
Ab
;
where b 
h
1 + (aQ=SQ)
i1=
and C =   (1  ) 1QW 1  : Substituting (A1)-
(A4) into the total cost function yields TC(Y ) = Y +Wf:
The parameter  is dened as the fraction of total costs spent on imported inputs:
 = SQM= (SQM +QZ) : Using (A4), I obtain the share of costs spent on imported
inputs as
 =

1  b 

:
Some rearranging yields the home share of inputs in (5). It can also be shown that the
partial elasticity of the marginal cost with respect to the exchange rate equals a share
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of import intensity:
@ ln
@ lnS
=
@ ln
@ ln b
 @ ln b
@ lnS
= ( )
h
 

1  b 
i
=  :
Next, I turn to prove the rms decision rule in (10) following the solution technique
of Devereux et al. (2004) and Engel (2006). Using the optimal price under PCP in
equation (8), I rearrange the expected discounted prots in equation (6) as
EPCP = e hE S
i hE   S
i1  ;
where e    (  1) 1 and 
  P ( )hf P D: Note that prices are preset one
period in advance, i.e., Et 1(Pt) = Pt: By taking a second-order approximation and
using ln(1 + x)  x, the (log) expected discounted prots under PCP can be computed
as
lnEPCP  ln + 
2
2
var(lnS) +
1
2
var(ln
) +
1  
2
var(ln)
+
"
cov(s; !) + (1  )cov(ln; lnS)
+(1  )cov(ln; ln
)
#
: (A6)
where   e exp [E (lnS)] exp [E (ln
)] exp [(1  )E (ln)] : Similarly, the expected
discounted prots under LCP in equation (9) can be shown as
ELCP = e [E (S
)] [E (  
)]1  :
Using the same approximation technique, the (log) expected discounted prots under
LCP can be computed as
lnELCP  + 
2
var(lnS) +
1
2
var(ln
) +
1  
2
var(ln)
+ [cov(lnS; ln
) + (1  )cov(ln; ln
)] : (A7)
Now, comparing (A6) with (A7) yields
lnEPCP   lnELCP = 1
2
var(lnS)  cov(ln; lnS)
=
1
2
var(lnS) + cov (ln b; lnS)
=
1
2
var(lnS)  

cov (ln (1   ) ; lnS) ;
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where the second line comes from the equation of marginal cost in (4) and the third line
comes from the home share of inputs in (5). The rms decision rule follows.
The model also accommodates the cases of perfect substitutes and perfect comple-
ments between domestic and foreign inputs. When domestic and foreign inputs are
perfect substitutes ( ! 1), whether or not rms use imported inputs depends on
the price-adjusted productivity term, ai=(SQ=Q). If a rm has an advantage in us-
ing imported inputs (ai=(SQ=Q) > 1), then it uses only imported inputs. In this
case, the right-hand side of the decision rule in (10) becomes var(lnS) and the rm
uses only LCP. On the contrary, if a rm has a disadvantage in using imported inputs
(ai=(SQ=Q) < 1), then it uses only domestic inputs. In this case, the right-hand side of
the decision rule in (10) becomes zero and the rm uses only PCP. If the price-adjusted
productivity term is unity, the rm is indi¤erent between the varieties of inputs and
also between invoicing currencies. In the case of perfect complements ( ! 0), rms use
both varieties and are indi¤erent between currencies.
Appendix B: Proof of Decision Rule under VCP
In this Appendix, I provide the proof to Proposition 3. Again I drop the subscript i for
brevity. Given the CES demand in (1), the rm presets its optimal prices to maximize
the expected discounted prots under PCP, LCP, and VCP, respectively:
pPCP =

  1 
E
 

Shv

E
 

Shv
 ;
pLCP =

  1 
E


S
fv

E


ShvS 1fv
 ;
pV CP =

  1 
E (
)
E (
Shv)
;
where 
  P ( )hf P D: Using these optimal prices, the expressions for the expected
discounted prots in equations (11)-(13) become
EPCP = e hE 
Shvi hE 
Shvi1  ;
ELCP = e hE 
ShvS 1fv i hE 
Sfvi1  ;
EV CP = e [E (
Shv)] [E (
)]1  ;
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where e    (  1) 1 : Following the solution technique in Appendix A, I take a
second-order approximation for these equations and rewrite them as
lnEPCP  ln + 1
2
var (ln
) +
1  
2
var (ln) +
2
2
var(lnShv) (B1)
+
"
cov(ln
; lnShv) + (1  )cov(ln; ln
)
+(1  )cov(lnShv; ln)
#
;
lnELCP  ln + 1
2
var (ln
) +
1  
2
var (ln) (B2)
+

2
var(lnShv) +
(1  )
2
var(lnSfv)
+
"
cov(ln
; lnShv) + (1  )cov(ln; ln
)
+(1  )cov(lnSfv; ln)  (1  )cov(lnShv; lnSfv)
#
;
lnEV CP  ln + 1
2
var (ln
) +
1  
2
var (ln) +

2
var(lnShv) (B3)
+ [cov(ln
; lnShv) + (1  )cov(ln; ln
)] ;
where  = e exp [(1  )E ln] exp [E lnShv] exp [E ln
] :
Comparing (B3) with (B1) and (B2), the conditions (14) and (15) in the main text
and Proposition 3 follow.
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